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Abstract This article examines why some entrepre-
neurial firms succeed while others do not. The focal
explanation is top management teams, including
several studies that address when and how top
management teams are likely to influence entrepre-
neurial firm performance. There are several insights.
First, large and diverse teams with a history of working
together are more likely to succeed. This effect is
particularly large when they launch in growth markets.
Second, teams are effective in making strategic
decisions when they are fast, highly conflictual, and
still get along. Third, they are also effective when they
rely on ‘‘simple rules’’ heuristics to perform significant
activities like new product development and interna-
tionalization that nonetheless happens often. A further
insight is that these ‘‘simple rules’’ can become the
strategy of their firms. Fourth, more effective teams
continuously organize the structures of their firms at
the ‘‘edge of chaos’’. Overall, top management teams
emerge as central to the success (or lack thereof) of
entrepreneurial firms.
Keywords Entrepreneurship  Top management
teams  Firm performance  Strategic decision making 
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1 Introduction
Why do some entrepreneurial firms succeed while
others do not? Economics has long considered how
industries emerge, evolve, and decline (e.g., Agarwal
and Gort 2002). Similarly, sociology has long studied
the entry and exit dynamics of populations of firms
(e.g., Sine et al. 2005; Hiatt et al. 2009). In both of
these disciplines, the emphasis is on the environment
such as its competitiveness, geographical features, and
institutional arrangements. Yet, despite extensive
research, these disciplines have looked much less into
why firms in seemingly similar environments often
have very disparate performance outcomes. To give an
example, many firms began in the social networking
space of the mid-2000s. Yet, while clearly Facebook
and LinkedIn have become stars, others such as
MySpace have fallen away and still others simply
never gained traction at all. Why? Are successful
entrepreneurial firms merely lucky? Or are there
organizational and strategic practices that effectively
help some entrepreneurial firms to shape success?
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Research on strategy and organization suggests
answers. For example, some entrepreneurial firms are
more successful when they form attractive alliance
portfolios (e.g., Baum et al. 2000; Ozcan and Eisenhardt
2009) or attract well-positioned, knowledgeable boards
of directors (e.g., Gulati and Higgins 2003; Garg and
Eisenhardt 2013). Others succeed when they introduce
desirable products or quickly find viable business
models (e.g., Zott and Amit 2010). Still others succeed
when they have savvy strategies or top-notch employees
(e.g., Beckman and Burton 2008; Eesley and Roberts
2012). Yet, while each of these explanations is likely to
be true, they all rest on the same foundation, i.e., the top
management team. After all, these executives are the
ones who lead activities such as building alliance
portfolios, developing new products, recruiting employ-
ees to the firm, and altogether oversee the myriad
activities that shape entrepreneurial firm performance.
The aim of this paper is to synthesize evidence from
several studies (i.e., two early and two recent) to
sharpen when and how top management teams influ-
ence the performance outcomes of entrepreneurial
firms. The first study uses statistical analysis of the
population of entrepreneurial firms in the U.S. semi-
conductor industry to reveal how their initial top
management teams, strategies, and markets influence
their subsequent growth (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven
1990). Although luck matters, the results also reveal
the critical importance of founding top management
teams for superior performance. The second study goes
deeply into the firms themselves. Using inductive and
multiple-case methods, it explores how top manage-
ment teams in 12 entrepreneurial firms in the computer
industry make strategic decisions (e.g., Eisenhardt and
Bourgeois 1988; Eisenhardt 1989a; Eisenhardt et al.
1997). The results indicate the ‘‘winning trifecta’’ of
speed, conflict, and getting along within top manage-
ment teams. This trifecta shapes a better strategic
decision process and ultimately superior entrepreneur-
ial firm performance. Taken together, these early
studies indicate a critical linkage among the charac-
teristics of top management teams, strategic decision
processes, and firm performance.
The third study combines statistical analyses with
inductive, multiple-case studies to explore how top
management teams learn as they engage in essential,
repeated process activities such as developing new
products, making acquisitions, and entering new
countries (e.g., Bingham et al. 2007; Bingham and
Eisenhardt 2011). The setting is an in-depth examina-
tion of internationalization by 12 U.S., Singaporean,
and Finnish entrepreneurial firms. The result is an
understanding of the relevance of learning heuristics
that we term ‘‘simple rules’’, rather than simply
gaining experience, to strategy and firm performance.
The fourth study takes a much different methodolog-
ical approach. It combines computer-based simulation
and mathematical modeling to explore how top
management teams should structure their organiza-
tions to achieve high firm performance (Davis et al.
2009). The findings reveal that top management teams
should poise at a structural ‘‘edge of chaos’’ to
maintain superior performance, especially in the
unpredictable markets that many entrepreneurial
teams face. The findings also indicate the challenges
of complex markets, attractiveness of high-velocity
ones, and the extensive role that luck plays in highly
ambiguous situations such as nascent markets.
Collectively, these four studies suggest the under-
lying mechanisms of team composition, strategic
decision process, strategy as ‘‘simple rules’’, and
structure at the ‘‘edge of chaos’’ by which top
management teams shape the performance of their
entrepreneurial firms. Collectively, these studies also
reveal what might be termed my empirical approach,
i.e., deep grounding in inductive, multiple-case theory
building methods, complemented by statistical and
simulation methods. The inductive, multiple-case
methods use rich field data to generate insights into
the behavioral processes within entrepreneurial firms
(Eisenhardt 1989b; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007).
Statistical analyses reveal broad patterns in large-scale
data that complement these case methods. Simulation
enables computational experimentation to explore the
insights gained from the other methods, especially
when the phenomena are non-linear and relevant data
are difficult or even impossible to obtain (Davis et al.
2007).
I conducted this research with outstanding collab-
orators. Kaye Schoonhoven was my primary partner in
the investigation of the U.S. semiconductor industry
(e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990, 1996;
Schoonhoven et al. 1990). Jay Bourgeois and I
gathered the field data on the strategic decision making
processes of entrepreneurial teams, and published
several papers jointly (e.g., Bourgeois and Eisenhardt
1988; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 1988; Eisenhardt
et al. 1997) in addition to my sole-authored work
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(Eisenhardt 1989a, 1990). I worked with Christopher
Bingham and Nathan Furr in the study of simple rules
(e.g., Bingham et al. 2007; Bingham and Eisenhardt
2011), building on my work with Donald Sull (Eisen-
hardt and Sull 2001; Sull and Eisenhardt 2012) and
Shona Brown (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, 1998).
Jason Davis, Christopher Bingham and I collaborated
on the simulation study (Davis et al. 2009).
Section 2 continues by discussing the broad brush
study of how top management teams, markets, and
innovation strategies influence entrepreneurial firm
performance in the U.S. semiconductor industry.
Section 3 describes the in-depth study of strategic
decision making by top management teams in the
computer industry that was undertaken simultaneously
with the first study. Section 4 presents the findings and
insights from examining how top management teams
learn ‘‘simple rules’’ heuristics, and their strategic and
performance implications for entrepreneurial firms
while Sect. 5 describes how entrepreneurial top
management teams optimally structure their firms at
the ‘‘edge of chaos’’ in different types of markets.
Section 6 synthesizes the collective results, and offers
implications that emerge from this collection of
studies.
2 Top management teams, strategy, markets
and performance
Entrepreneurial firms have a high propensity to fail
that has been termed the ‘‘liability of newness’’
(Stinchcombe 1965). This liability occurs for a
variety of reasons. For example, entrepreneurial
firms often have limited resources that restrict their
resilience and ability to adapt. Firm members are
new to their roles and relationships with one another,
and so are often inefficient and error-prone. Entre-
preneurial firms lack ‘‘track records’’ with buyers,
suppliers, and other constituents which make it
difficult to succeed.
Yet, while the validity of the ‘‘liability of newness’’
has often been empirically demonstrated (e.g., Free-
man et al. 1983), this research fails to grapple with a
critical observation. There are enormous differences in
the performance of entrepreneurial firms. Some young
firms become resounding successes and so clearly
overcome the ‘‘liability of newness’’. Names such as
Apple, Google, and FourSquare come to mind. Yet,
others languish or die. Kaye Schoonhoven and I
undertook a study to probe why these differences
occur.
Our study was novel in its use of growth as the
measure of entrepreneurial firm performance. In
contrast, many studies look simply at survival or
perhaps IPO which are empirically easier to measure
and statistically more tractable because they can be
represented as 0/1 events. But survival is a crude
measure of success, and fails to distinguish between
very successful firms and those that cling to life as the
‘‘living dead’’. IPO and other positive exits like
acquisition are better measures than survival, but still
do not discriminate well among firms (e.g., even weak
firms can IPO) and fail to capture relevant differences
among top management teams and their investors such
as their preferences for liquidity versus control
(Wasserman 2003). Our study was also novel in its
combining the significant main effects that seem likely
to influence performance, including the top manage-
ment team, market, strategy, and their interactions, in
a single study. Thus, we take each of these effects very
seriously rather than simply relegating them to statis-
tical controls. This let us more sharply hone in on
relative effects.
The research setting is the U.S. semiconductor
industry. This is an attractive industry for our research
aims for two reasons. First, it has an unusually rich
variation in top management teams, i.e., ranging from
sole founders with deep technical backgrounds to
large and diverse teams with extensive industry
experience. Second, it also has rich variation in
markets. Indeed, the industry is actually a mosaic of
sub-markets such as ASICs, analog, and microproces-
sors, i.e., some large and some small, some growing
and some stagnant, and some highly competitive and
some not.
Our data collection involved laboriously gathering
both archival and interview data. We used archival
data from market research firms for annual informa-
tion on markets including size, number of competi-
tors, and concentration ratio. We used interviews with
CEO’s, founders, and other key executives to obtain
annual information on the top management team,
financial performance, alliance partners, organiza-
tional design, and strategy. We worked in pairs with
one researcher conducting the interview and the other
recording the data and making observations. We
assessed the top management teams by measures
Top management teams and the performance of entrepreneurial firms 807
123
including number of founders, managerial experience,
and percentage who had worked together previously.
We assessed performance by annual revenue growth,
and strategy in terms of the degree to which the firm
was engaged in cutting-edge innovation. We supple-
mented these data with 10-K and annual reports as
well as press releases and media coverage. We ended
our interviews by asking our informants to discuss the
reasons for their success or lack thereof. We were
surprised at how little these otherwise knowledgeable
executives understood. From their point of view,
success was invariably determined by ‘‘our terrific
people’’ while failure was driven by bad luck, poor
timing, and tough rivals. Our results told a more
nuanced story.
First, top management teams have an enormous
influence on the success of their entrepreneurial firms.
Specifically, larger teams, teams with more diversity
in age and experience, and teams with a history of
working together were much more likely to launch
successful entrepreneurial firms with significant
growth (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990). The
underlying reasons include that large (i.e., 4–5 mem-
bers) and diverse teams simply have more people with
more unique skills to do the intense and multi-faceted
work of founding a new firm. Teams with some
members with extensive industry experience and
others without it often bring diverse points of view.
Teams that have substantial prior experience with each
other seem to have advantages in already having met
some of the challenges of working together and indeed
having enough experience together to know that they
can be effective as a team.
Second, there is a very strong interaction effect
between top management teams and markets. That is,
entrepreneurial firms with superior teams (i.e., large,
diverse age and experience, prior experience together)
and in growth markets (i.e., markets with scale that are
growing at over 20 percent per year) are likely to
perform significantly better than other entrepreneurial
firms (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990). So
although the main effects of top management teams
and markets are significant, the interaction effects are
stunningly strong. In contrast, firms either founded by
weak teams (i.e., small and homogeneous with little
experience together) or founded in emergent (i.e., new
and less than US$20 million) or mature markets (i.e.,
large with slow growth) perform less well. Emergent
markets are problematic because the timing of their
take-off (if ever) can be very long, and entrepreneurs
are challenged by the delays and their own limited
resources. Mature markets are better in that entrepre-
neurial firms can sometimes locate very profitable
niches such as military products, but these markets are
too stable and often locked up by established incum-
bents. Overall, the combination of a superior team in a
great market is over-whelming in its likelihood of
leading to high performance. To use a very ‘‘Califor-
nia’’ analogy, it takes a skilled surfer and a huge wave
to get a great ride.
Third, founding top management teams and mar-
kets are highly predictive of future firm performance.
Specifically, small advantages such as a slightly larger
team at founding are amplified, not dissipated, over
time (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990). For exam-
ple, a slightly advantaged firm might get the key
alliance partner over a slightly less promising firm.
This relationship then leads to more favorable rela-
tionships, creating a cascade of advantages. These
advantages appeared to compound over time such that
performance differences among firms grew not dimin-
ished. In addition, these top management teams often
set a course at founding that becomes difficult to
change as resource commitments, and organizational
cultures and structures are locked in. The unexpected
insight is that turnarounds are very rare events. Once
de-railed, an entrepreneurial firm rarely recovers.
Founding conditions are very consequential.
Finally, strong teams and superior markets are
almost completely uncorrelated. This surprised us. We
expected that strong teams would choose the best
markets, but they do not. Rather, founding entrepre-
neurs typically choose markets that they happen to
know because of their own idiosyncratic paths of
experiences. This introduces significant luck into the
performance equation of entrepreneurial firms.
3 Top management teams and strategic decision
making
While the broad brush study of entrepreneurial firm
performance in the U.S. semiconductor industry
described above was ongoing, a much different and
more granular study of strategic decision making in the
computer industry was also underway. Here, the
emphasis is on in-depth and rich field data to
explore how top management teams effectively
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(and ineffectively) make the key strategic decisions
that shape the trajectories of their firms and, ultimately,
firm performance.
A novel feature of this study was its focus on ‘‘high-
velocity’’ environments, i.e., settings characterized by
rapid, unpredictable, and frequent change around core
features such as products, customers, demand, com-
petition, and complementers. Industry structure is
fleeting and often unknown. Many entrepreneurs jump
into these environments because of the many compel-
ling opportunities that they often provide. Yet, in
contrast, prior to this study, most research on strategic
decision making focused on not-for-profit contexts
like hospitals and universities and on stable industries
like chemicals and forest products (Eisenhardt and
Zbaracki 1992). The classic models of strategic
making that emerged from such studies including
bounded rationality, power and politics, and ‘‘garbage
can’’ choice did not fit well with high-velocity
environments where pace and agility are important,
and competition is intense and demanding (Eisenhardt
and Zbaracki 1992).
A second novel feature was its use of what became
my ‘‘signature method’’, i.e., theory-building from
multiple-case studies. I began developing this method
in this study, and wrote the related paper on theory-
building from cases that became very widely cited at
this time (Eisenhardt 1989b). This approach to theory-
building involves inductive reasoning grounded in rich
data on the focal phenomenon to develop new
constructs and theoretical relationships. It contrasts
with other theory-building approaches such as math-
ematical modeling and ‘‘arm-chair’’ thinking. It is a
particularly appropriate methods choice when there is
no applicable existing theory. So, it is ideal for
opening new areas of inquiry. Multiple cases simply
mean using more than one instantiation of the focal
phenomenon from which to induct theory. Multiple
cases are typically more effective than single cases
because they ground the emergent theory in more
observations, thus leading to more precise, accurate
constructs and theoretical relationships (Eisenhardt
1991). By contrast, single case studies often yield
overly complex theories because it is difficult or even
impossible to rule out many explanations and to
theorize at the appropriate level of abstraction (Eisen-
hardt and Graebner 2007).
The original plan called for a deductive study using
the complete population of about 100 entrepreneurial
firms in the ‘‘high-velocity’’ computing industry. But
while Jay Bourgeois and I intended to do a deductive,
statistical study, we switched to inductive, multiple-
case methods early on because the data from the first
few firms were so very unexpected and intriguing. We
wrote the first academic paper with data from 4 firms
(Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 1988), and ultimately
studied 12.
The data collection required an intense field effort
in which the primary data sources were interviews and
observations. We started with an entry interview with
the CEO to identify a recent or ongoing strategic
decision for in-depth study. This decision had to have
high stakes, involve the entire team, and be represen-
tative of how the team made its major decisions. We
then interviewed all top management team members.
We began by asking open-ended questions about
topics such as strategy, competition, and interactions
among team members. This gave us broad under-
standing. We then delved into the specific story of
each focal strategic decision—concentrating on the
timeline of facts and events rather than respondents’
interpretations of events and motives of others. We
supplemented these data with extensive observations,
and questionnaire data on topics such as power,
communication, and conflict as well as archival data
such as media and press releases, and quantitative data
on team demographics and firm financial performance.
The result is insights and emergent theory relating the
strategic decision making process to performance in
entrepreneurial firms.
The overarching insight is that the ‘‘trifecta’’ of
speed, conflict, and harmony is at the heart of
effective strategic decision making. In particular, the
most effective top management teams are fast— i.e.,
they make critical strategic choices in less than
3 months and often less than 6 weeks—and have
very intense conflict about these choices (Eisenhardt
1989a). Yet, they still maintain cordial relationships.
In contrast, the least effective teams are slow, i.e.,
they often take 6 months or more to make the types
of strategic decisions that the fast teams can make in
under 3 months. Sometimes, these teams have
intense conflict, but this conflict is often locked into
fixed political factions and becomes personal (Eisen-
hardt and Bourgeois 1988). Sometimes, teams have
little conflict but that is usually indicative of apathy
and a false ‘‘feel-good’’ feeling (Eisenhardt et al.
1997). Finally, an effective strategic decision-making
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process ultimately helps to shape superior entrepre-
neurial firm performance.
While this trifecta is valuable to identify, it is not
enough. It leaves open what the teams actually did. For
example, how should teams be fast? They could flip a
coin, but this clearly sacrifices quality. They might
limit the data considered, slash the number of alter-
natives, and reduce analysis. They might restrict
discussion, squash conflict, and centralize the deci-
sion. But these too will sacrifice quality, and frustrate
key executives. In a series of papers (e.g., Eisenhardt
and Bourgeois 1988; Eisenhardt 1989a, 1990; Eisen-
hardt et al. 1997), we develop an understanding of
what more (and less) effective teams do. While there
are several relevant behaviors, I focus below on the
three most significant ones.
The first is information, i.e., effective top manage-
ment teams rely on more, not less, information than
less effective teams (e.g., Eisenhardt 1989a; Eisen-
hardt et al. 1997). This was a surprise because prior
research argues that comprehensive decision making
with extensive data is slow. The key is to realize that
this information is a unique type, i.e., real-time
information about the external environment such as
customers and competitors, and internal operations
such as progress against engineering milestones,
factory yield, and revenue per employee. Often, this
information is quantitative and frequent such as daily
bookings and cash flow. Operational measures are
preferred over refined accounting-based ones like
profit. Moreover, effective top management teams
review this information in regular weekly (or even
more frequent) meetings with everyone on the team.
These teams simply look at more data, more often—
particularly immediate operating information from
inside and outside the firm. As an executive in a very
effective team claims, ‘‘We over-MBA it!’’. The result
is deep intuition, quick recognition of change, less
personalized debate, and greater confidence to act
(Eisenhardt 1989a; Eisenhardt et al. 1997).
The second insight is simultaneous alternatives,
i.e., effective top management teams rely on more, not
fewer, alternatives than less effective teams, and
consider them simultaneously, not in parallel (Eisen-
hardt 1989a; Eisenhardt et al. 1997). Again, this was a
surprise, as we had expected that more alternatives
would slow the pace and create too much conflict. For
example, a very effective team in our study faced a
strategic decision to redirect the firm. The team
developed multiple alternatives ranging from selling
technology, liquidation, entry into a new market, and
tactical changes to the current strategy. Intriguingly,
team members sometimes consciously introduced
alternatives that they did not back in order to expand
the set. The result was a more thorough exploration of
alternatives that took advantage of the fact that
individuals cognitively process faster and with greater
confidence when they do so in comparison (Eisenhardt
1989a). Multiple alternatives also improve the likeli-
hood that team members can reach a compromise that
all can support, and create a backup position in case
the preferred alternative does not work (Eisenhardt
et al. 1997).
The third insight is consensus with qualification,
i.e., effective top management teams try for consen-
sus, but make the choice if no consensus emerges
(Eisenhardt 1989a). Typically, the ultimate decision
maker is the executive who is most knowledgeable or
most responsible for carrying out the choice. Consen-
sus with qualification relies on clear demarcation of
turf, i.e., each team member has the highest power in a
few decisions that defined turf while the CEO has the
highest average power across all decisions, but highest
power for only a few (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois
1988). In contrast, less effective teams use either
consensus or fiat, both of which are slow and create
interpersonal conflict (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois
1988). Consensus with qualification is effective
because it proactively deals with conflict, airs the
different views of team members, and provides a path
to closure that executives believe is fair, i.e., execu-
tives want to be involved, but do not insist on always
getting their way (Eisenhardt 1989a; Eisenhardt et al.
1997).
4 Top management teams and strategy as simple
rules
The research on strategic decision making described
above created an understanding of how top manage-
ment teams effectively make critical decisions. But,
these decisions are idiosyncratic choices that rarely
repeat. In contrast, top management teams also face
many smaller choices around recurring process activ-
ities like making acquisitions, developing new prod-
ucts, entering new countries, and hiring employees.
But while these activities may occur often, they are not
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routine. The challenge for the top management team is
to perform them efficiently while remaining flexible to
adjust to the specific circumstances of any particular
acquisition, product, and the like.
My initial work with Behnam Tabrizi and Shona
Brown examines new product development, i.e., a
process that is central to the success of most entrepre-
neurial firms. One study examines ‘‘fast’’ product
development (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995) and the
other focuses on developing successive successful
products (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997). As we puzzled
over the empirical results, Shona and I were frustrated
by existing theories and searched for a new lens. We
found it in biology with complexity theory and its
‘‘edge of chaos’’ concept. Based on this work, she and
I wrote Competing on the Edge: Strategy as Structured
Chaos (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997). Donald Sull and
I extend these ideas in ‘‘Strategy as Simple Rules’’
(Eisenhardt and Sull 2001, 2012). But while these
ideas are grounded in specific companies and real data,
they rely on anecdotes and hunches. They needed
systematic evidence.
This work sets up the study with Christopher
Bingham that fleshes out ‘‘strategy as simple rules’’.
We use learning theory as our starting point. The
learning literature typically measures accumulated
experience of some type with some repeated process
like making acquisitions or forming alliances, and then
infers that learning occurred when process perfor-
mance improves. Yet, a striking feature of this
research is that it ignores the content of what is
learned. Thus, although there is much research that
claims that firms and individuals are (or not) learning
(e.g., Argote 1999; Haleblian and Finkelstein 1999),
learning itself is not assessed. This study is novel in
that it measures what individuals actually learn when
they gain experience.
The research design combines both inductive,
multiple cases, and deductive hypothesis testing. The
focal process is internationalization. We sampled 12
entrepreneurial firms in the information technology
sector with approximately 70 new country entries. We
chose this sector because its many entrepreneurial
firms often have global aspirations, making interna-
tionalization essential. We studied firms from Finland,
U.S., and Singapore to improve the generalizability of
the study. We relied on interviews, questionnaires,
archival data, observations, emails, and phone calls.
We focused on and assessed explicit learning, i.e.,
what people could articulate that they learned. We did
so through responses to an open-end, non-directive
request to tell the ‘‘story’’ of a particular country entry,
and through responses to explicit questions about what
(if anything) had been learned in a particular country
that was used elsewhere and vice versa. We deter-
mined that learning occurred when multiple infor-
mants described the same lessons.
The initial findings mostly confirm what Donald
Sull and I had surmised, i.e., people learn ‘‘simple
rules’’ heuristics that have a common structure around
opportunity capture (e.g., successful country entry)
(Eisenhardt and Sull 2001). Specifically, people learn
‘‘selection’’ heuristics that are rules of thumb for
guiding what opportunities to pursue (e.g., enter only
Asian countries), and ‘‘procedure’’ heuristics that
specify how to capture an opportunity (e.g., hire
locals to enter). They also learn ‘‘temporal’’ heuristics
related to timing such as sequence (e.g., order of
approaching customer types), pace (e.g., complete one
entry before starting the next) and rhythm (e.g.,
number of entries per year), ‘‘priority’’ heuristics that
are rules of thumb to rank acceptable opportunities
(e.g., give preference to Rosetta standard countries),
and ‘‘exit’’ heuristics that specify when to stop (e.g.,
stop pursuing a customer after 3 months without a
sale) (Bingham and Eisenhardt 2011). Why these
heuristics? They fit the problem-solving context of
capturing a flow of similar, but not identical,
opportunities.
Our initial findings also confirm that ‘‘simple rules’’
heuristics improve firm performance. Specifically, top
management teams that translate their experiences
into ‘‘simple rules’’ are more likely to achieve
effective performance than teams that just accumulate
experience (Bingham et al. 2007). In other words,
simply gaining experience does not significantly affect
performance unless that experience is sharpened by
‘‘simple rules’’ heuristics. Why are such heuristics
effective? They speed action by requiring less infor-
mation and simplifying cognitive processes. But, a
subtler reason is that heuristics are often surprisingly
accurate because they exploit information that people
have without being explicit about what that informa-
tion is. For example, one effective top management
team in our study had a ‘‘simple rule’’ to only enter
English-speaking countries. But, while simple and
easy to use, this heuristic also exploits the nuanced
cultural and business knowledge of one of the
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founders who grew up in the UK and had much
familiarity with the British Commonwealth nations
which comprise most English-speaking countries. By
contrast, executives, who simply gain experience,
often treated each new country as a unique and novel
event, and so did not effectively leverage past entries.
Rather, they either impulsively went to a country with
little thought or engaged in complex, information-
intensive analyses to plan their actions. But neither of
these approaches is as effective as using heuristics.
But while the study confirmed our expectations, it
also broke new ground. First, we find that heuristics
are learned in a specific developmental order because
some heuristics are easier to learn than others (Bing-
ham and Eisenhardt 2011). Specifically, top manage-
ment teams learn selection and procedural heuristics
quickly, but take longer to learn temporal and priority
ones. Exit heuristics are the most difficult to learn.
Why is there an order to learning? It appears that it is
more challenging to learn heuristics that involve
relationships among several opportunities. These
heuristics like priority and temporal rules require
more cognitive sophistication to learn as people
simultaneously must keep in mind information about
several experiences while making cognitive links
among them. Overall, this developmental order seems
to mirror the transition from novice to expert (Ericsson
and Kintsch 1995), i.e., in comparison with novices,
experts keep more thoughts in mind at once, think in
terms of relationships among features like priorities
and sequences of activities, and better integrate past
and future times. For example, expert firefighters
interpret a fire scene by what preceded and what is
likely to follow while novices tend to focus on
immediate features like color and intensity (Klein
1998). Thus, the later developmental order of learning
of priority, temporal, and exit heuristics later than
selection and procedural ones is consistent with the
transition from novice to expert through accumulated
experience.
Second, effective top management teams engage in
simplification cycling by which they update their
heuristics, but do not increase the number. So, they
both elaborate their heuristics as they gain experience,
but they also contract them by dropping and simpli-
fying, and by changing abstraction levels (Bingham
and Eisenhardt 2011). Simplification cycling is the
way in which teams update and improve their heuris-
tics without creating greater complexity. Again, this
resembles the transition from novice to expert. For
example, studies of experts in bridge, physics, base-
ball, and electronics all indicate that experts use
heuristics based on more abstract and strategic aspects
of their situations (Feltovich et al. 2006). So, bridge
experts pay attention to the number of cards in each
suit which is closely related to winning. Novices track
the number of aces played which is easier to remember
but less relevant to winning (Charness et al. 2001).
Similarly, physics experts rely on general laws like
conservation of momentum to solve problems while
novices concentrate on superficial features like
whether the problem involves a spring or a plane
(Chi et al. 1981). Finally, experts are reflective about
what and how they know. They keep refining their
heuristics even as they keep the number small such
that they can improvise flexibly and update their
heuristics more effectively (Cowan 2001).
Overall, this study suggests that ‘‘simple rules’’
heuristics and related organizational processes enable
top management teams to seize opportunities in an
effective and differentiated way. In effect, they are the
strategy of entrepreneurial firms and central to the
strategic logic of opportunity (Bingham and Eisen-
hardt 2008). Indeed, heuristics are more ‘‘rational’’ for
entrepreneurial top management teams who typically
navigate in ‘‘high-velocity’’ environments than the use
of extensive information and complex analysis (Bing-
ham and Eisenhardt 2011).
5 Top management teams and organizational
structures at the edge of chaos
The studies discussed above point to the critical role of
top management teams in determining the perfor-
mance of their entrepreneurial firms, and indicate how
these teams do so by making major strategic decisions
and learning ‘‘simple rules’’. The fourth study goes a
step further to examine how top management teams
design effective organizational structures by balanc-
ing at the ‘‘edge of chaos’’ (Davis et al. 2009). By
structure, we refer broadly to all manner of structures
including formalization (e.g., rules and routines),
centralization (e.g., hierarchy, verticality), span of
control (e.g., scale of sub-units), coupling and struc-
tural embeddedness (e.g., tie strength, tie density), and
specialization (e.g., role breadth). We define structure
simply as constraint on action.
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Prior research across diverse literatures including
network theory, strategy, organization studies, and the
complexity sciences finds that a balance between too
much and too little structure is essential for high
performance in dynamic environments (see Davis
et al. 2009 for a review). Firms with too little structure
lack enough guidance to perform efficiently while
firms with too much structure are too constrained and
lack flexibility. This suggests an inverted-U relation-
ship between structure and performance. Much
research also finds that the optimal amount of structure
decreases with increasing dynamism (i.e., inverted-U
shifts left) (Davis et al. 2009).
But while these observations appear broadly true,
unresolved issues remain. First, the empirical evi-
dence consists of case study and statistical analyses
using quadratic terms that are not sufficiently precise
to identify specific functional form. Rather, it confirms
a unimodal shape, but does not rule out other shapes
such as a plateau or an inverted-V. Second, the theory
underlying the relationship is incomplete. For exam-
ple, the theory ignores the downsides of flexibility
such as more mistakes and greater need for attention.
As a result, the theory fails to clarify precisely the
efficiency–flexibility trade-off, including whether
there is a skew such that either too much or too little
structure is more disadvantageous. Finally, the theory
underlying construct of market dynamism is impre-
cise. Market dynamism is a multi-dimensional con-
struct, and yet the theory does not unpack its
dimensions like velocity, complexity, ambiguity, and
unpredictability to reveal whether they have distinct or
similar effects.
We conducted this research using simulation meth-
ods which are effective for research when the basic
outline of the theory is understood, but its theoretical
logic is incomplete (Davis et al. 2007). Simulation is
also especially useful when the focal phenomenon is
non-linear, and data (e.g., uncorrelated environmental
dimensions and longitudinal effects) are challenging to
obtain. Specifically, we use stochastic process model-
ing. We model the firm as a collection of rules, structure
as the number of rules, and environment as a flow of
opportunities with varying velocity, complexity, ambi-
guity, and uncertainty. In each simulation time step, the
firm uses a combination of rules and improvised actions
to attempt to capture an opportunity. If a sufficient
number of actions match the opportunity, the opportu-
nity is captured and performance is increased by the
value of the opportunity. The simulation experiments
systematically vary the number of rules and the
environmental dimensions to determine the effects on
performance as measured by the number and value of
opportunities captured. We supplement the simulation
with a formal mathematical model to sharpen the
insights.
A core insight clarifies the tension between effi-
ciency and flexibility. That is, the central trade-off is
the flexible capture of widely varying opportunities
versus efficient execution of specific opportunities
(Davis et al. 2009). Less structure opens the firm to the
possibility of capturing a wider range of opportunities
that might serendipitously occur. But less structure
also takes more time because mistakes are more likely
and because individuals have to pay more attention to
what to do. Conversely, more structure enables the
efficient execution of particular opportunities that are
anticipated. But too much structure is more than just
too rigid, it narrows the range of possible opportuni-
ties, suggesting that structure is most valuable when
many similar opportunities exist.
Further, the relationship between structure and
performance is actually skewed such that having too
little structure is more damaging than having too much
(Davis et al. 2009). This occurs because too little
structure makes it very difficult to have any traction to
accomplish tasks. Top management teams become
overwhelmed by mistakes and consumed by figuring
out what to do. In contrast, too much structure narrows
the range of opportunities, but nonetheless capturing
some opportunities very efficiently is still possible.
Since entrepreneurial firms typically have little struc-
ture, the implication for their top management teams is
to structure quickly and more extensively than might
seem comfortable to entrepreneurs. Yet, without
sufficient structure, these firms may simply not be
able to accomplish very much, and so fail.
Finally, the shape of the relationship between
structure and performance varies across environments
(Davis et al. 2009). In predictable markets, it is a
plateau such that the trade-off between flexibility and
efficiency is easy to manage. There is a broad range of
optimal structures, and it is possible to achieve a stable
equilibrium. Here, the entrepreneurial team can be
successful with a range of structures from tightly
linked activity systems to loosely linked ‘‘simple
rules’’. But, in stark contrast, in unpredictable markets,
the optimal structure is low, and the relationship
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between structure and performance is an inverted-V
such that there is only a narrow band of optimal
structures. Here, it is both challenging and crucial for
top management teams to manage the amount of
structure. Even minor market changes can be punish-
ing, since performance is precarious and mistakes are
many, large, and often fatal. Since entrepreneurial
firms often operate in unpredictable markets, the
implication is that their top management teams must
typically pay particular attention to the amount of
structure, focus on real-time improvisation within a
few rules, continually recover from mistakes, and
quickly exit failing opportunities (Davis et al. 2009).
Other features of the environment are also relevant
for top management teams (Davis et al. 2009). High-
velocity markets which are characterized by many
rapidly changing opportunities are very favorable
environments in which it is possible to have very high
performance. The implication for top management
teams is to operate quickly. In contrast, complex
markets in which teams must perform many tasks well
are very unfavorable environments in which perfor-
mance is usually low. Examples include biotechnol-
ogy and ‘‘green power’’ which are both technically and
institutionally demanding such that entrepreneurs
have to be successful in many ways (e.g., technical,
safety, manufacturing, government relationships, etc.)
to be successful overall. The implication here is to
enter with caution. Finally, ambiguous markets such
as very nascent ones are especially intriguing. Since
they are so hard to interpret, these markets favor luck,
and so level the playing field for weaker top manage-
ment teams. Weaker teams can ‘‘win’’ simply by
chance. In contrast, unambiguous markets favor strong
top management teams because these are markets in
which their skills in managing are more likely to pay
off. The implication is that strong top management
teams should either try to structure nascent markets to
their advantage or avoid them.
6 Conclusion
I began by arguing that differences among top
management teams often shape the heterogeneous
performance outcomes that are observed among
entrepreneurial firms in ostensibly similar environ-
ments. The aim of the paper is to synthesize several
studies that collectively sharpen understanding of the
very influential role of top management teams in
driving the performance of entrepreneurial firms.
First, top management teams can substantially
influence the performance of entrepreneurial firms.
In particular, some top management teams are more
likely than others to create successful entrepreneurial
firms. Such strong teams are typically large, diverse,
and have a prior working history together (Eisenhardt
and Schoonhoven 1990). Moreover, when these strong
teams are in growth markets where there is typically
low ambiguity, moderate unpredictability, and high
velocity, they are particularly likely to have very high
performing firms (Davis et al. 2009). In other words,
there is a very strong interaction effect between top
management teams and the markets of their firms.
Second, top management teams help their firms to
succeed through effective strategic decision making,
i.e., decision making that is fast, high conflict, and yet
ultimately leaves the cohesiveness of the team intact
(Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 1988; Eisenhardt 1989a;
Eisenhardt et al. 1997). Such teams make more timely
and more effective strategic decisions. But making
these idiosyncratic strategic decisions is only part of
the story of how top management teams influence the
performance of entrepreneurial firms. More effective
top management teams are also able to scale more
effectively and perform when they use ‘‘simple rules’’
in critical organizational processes such as acquisi-
tions and internationalization as their strategy (Bing-
ham et al. 2007; Bingham and Eisenhardt 2011).
Finally, top management teams can influence firm
performance by organizing at the ‘‘edge of chaos’’. In
particular, top management teams that quickly struc-
ture (and even slightly over-structure) their entrepre-
neurial firms and keep that structure poised at an
optimal point gain performance advantages and avoid
the ‘‘wheel-spinning’’ that comes with too little
structure (Davis et al. 2009).
In conclusion, top management teams—through
their composition and their actions—can have a
significant influence on the performance of entrepre-
neurial firms. In such young and small firms, these
teams often have greater opportunity to shape the
course of their firms than executives of large, estab-
lished firms. Of course, attractive markets, favorable
government policies, and even luck, matter too. But,
the point of this article is to remind the reader of the
powerful role of top management teams—their com-
position, strategic choices, ability to learn, and
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organizational skills—in determining the performance
of entrepreneurial firms.
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